GarrettCom Ethernet Networks and Web Management Manuel utilisateur

Secure Industrial Control Utilizing High Speed

Ethernet Networks and Web Management

GarrettCom, Inc.

47823 Westinghouse Drive

Fremont, CA 94539

PH: (510) 438-9071

FAX: (510) 438-9072

www.GarrettCom.com

INTRODUCTION

This paper explores the state of network security options today at the Ethernet switch level and offers

an elementary roadmap for industrial operations to plan for and deploy secure communications

systems. Industrial systems need to take advantage of the advanced networking technologies that can

support greater efficiency, reliability, and security in plant and remote operations. As SCADA

systems, relays, and other industrial control, monitoring and management systems become more

intelligent, a rich supply of data is available for improving plant performance and remote maintenance

and management. However, as with all technology advances, there are challenges as well as

opportunities.

SECURITY OVERVIEW

In today’s uncertain world, security stands beside profitability, productivity, performance and control

as a key element for maintaining business activities in industrial facilities. Prevention of malicious

attacks against business infrastructure has become as vital to ongoing success as has the widespread

use of the computer systems which make such attacks so easy and so painful. It is no longer enough to

catch the perpetrator during or after the commission of a malicious act; considerable time and expense

is being consumed to address how to secure systems to prevent intrusion.

Repercussions from the 2003 power blackout in the Northeastern US were felt throughout the country.

Attacks such as the Zobot worm and Mytob bot software effectively shut down well protected

computers at CNN, the New York Times and many other places. Imagine how much worse a

concentrated and widespread act of industrial sabotage might be.

Until just recently, SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) environments were not

considered at risk for cyber attack because of the highly customized nature of these systems. In March

2002, articles were still being written that debunked the concern for more security of utility service

providers. Yet this viewpoint is compromised by documented cyber-related incidents, such as the

Slammer Worm infiltration of an Ohio Nuclear power plant, and the wireless attack on a sewage-

SCADA system in Queensland Australia.

More and more industrial sites are taking advantage of Ethernet as a mature, end-to-end, standards-

based networking, communications and data transmission protocol because it offers convenience and

efficiency that bring higher performance and lower cost. In addition, the standards that are in place

support interoperability among many competing equipment vendors as well as world-wide

interconnectivity. At the same time, more extensive use of Ethernet/IP and other well-documented

protocols will make hacking and disruption easier if adequate security measures are not taken.

Password protection, encryption, access authorization and firewalls are some of the many tools

available to protect against cyber invasion.

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY INITIATIVES

While there are similarities between security in enterprise business IT systems (which protects

activities such as bank and stock transactions and on-line purchases), and that required by industrial

control systems, several groups have been chartered to address the technology opportunities and

challenges specific to industrial applications. At the broadest level, the Instrumentation Systems and

Automation Society (ISA) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are looking

at overall security practices for industry. (See APPENDIX A)

On a more specific industrial level, there are groups such as the North American Electric Reliability

Council, which has been named by the US DoE as the electric energy sector’s coordinator for critical

infrastructure protection. The NAERC’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee addresses

security concerns and provides guidelines and requirements for utility systems including SCADA and

EMS.

ETHERNET SECURITY – THE SWITCH VENDOR’S OPPORTUNITY

No single vendor or single technology is going to make industry safe from intentional cyber attacks.

Nonetheless, it is critical that vendors of industrial equipment look at ways in which to support the

overall security effort. Standards-based Ethernet networks, with cost effective hardware and software

available from many competing vendors, can make a significant impact. For example, leading Ethernet

switch vendors are adding security in the switch with IEEE and other standards support for security

features.

As Ethernet has expanded into outlying industrial facilities, two types of network structures emerge:

Local and Remote. The Local Ethernet structure is within the walls of a single facility which can be

closely watched, with the only serious security risk being from disgruntled employees or persons who

have penetrated the physical security of the plant. Access to data running across this type of Local

Ethernet network can be protected by segregating it with VLANs (Virtual Local Area Networks).

VLANs can be configured to restrict points of access from the outside world and can employ password

protection to provide authorization, authentication, and access control tethered to the Ethernet network

itself. Telnet managed by the switch can be used for remote login to the switch manager software.

However, Ethernet’s benefits to industrial applications run far beyond such restricted local

applications. Much Ethernet connectivity is deployed beyond a single plant and local-only networks

would limit the ability to manage, monitor and collect data from remote operations. Ethernet, using

fiber cabling for distance, noise-immunity and security, is deployed throughout widely distributed

industrial applications. Interconnecting multiple water treatment plants or power substations within a

metropolitan area are typical examples

Remote industrial Ethernet implementations are very popular applications for monitoring (the Data

Acquisition (DA) part of SCADA). They are typically closed systems, which require in-facility access

points for information review, as opposed to casual Internet access from the home or from the remote

laptop of a maintenance supervisor. Within the closed system, remote monitoring may be possible,

eliminating many routine maintenance visits to unmanned outlying operations, with concomitant

reduction in costs. It is also easier to identify potential problems and dispatch maintenance or repair

teams promptly – often avoiding down time or managing outages.

The only security risk in a closed system is a physical breach of the network, and even in the case of

such an event, password protection goes a long way to providing data security. The downside is the

lost opportunity for efficiencies and savings because of the limits placed on management and control

of industrial operations from afar.

Management Supervision and Control – the SC part of SCADA - of remote sites over Ethernet has

traditionally been used less often simply because of concerns regarding security. If these concerns can

be properly addressed, the benefits of controlling the functioning of equipment in remote locations

such as power substations, and linking outlying facilities such as aircraft maintenance hubs and other

far-flung industrial applications. Web access provides very significant efficiency improvements and

cost-savings, but this is also the area of greatest threat since the whole world has access to the Internet.

Ethernet equipment vendors must, therefore, take the lead in providing security for Ethernet networks,

and, furthermore, must support the more broad-based systemic security requirements from such

standards bodies as the ISA and NIST and NERC.

Once a closed-loop network is opened to access to and from the web, password protection is no longer

enough. While security has multiple components, Ethernet equipment can address security issues by

providing protection in the areas of concern documented by the ISA SP99 committee:

•assuring that a user is who he/she claims to be (authentication) and access authorization

for that user

•encryption and validation as data crosses the Internet so that it cannot be easily

accessed and stolen

•filtering and blocking access control

•providing audit, measurement, monitoring and detection tools;

While Ethernet switch management software can, and should, attend to these components,

implementation requires sophisticated security management advice making best use of standards,

guidelines and experts.

ETHERNET SECURITY STANDARDS

Where web access is convenient, security does not have to be compromised. Authentication and

encryption can be implemented today in industrial environments by using the same standards and

controls that handle the world’s financial transactions via the web. Through established security

standards, network management software can provide this functionality by providing Simple Network

Management Protocol Ver. 3 (SNMP v3), Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security

(TLS). These features allow an Ethernet switch to handle HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure

(HTTPS), the highest level of Web access security available.

Other security strategies available to Ethernet equipment include port security, remote Telnet access

security, password protection and remote unit cut-off protection. Appendix B offers a brief primer on

the components of some of the most well-known security standards.

BEYOND THE SWITCH

Broader system security policies, physical and functional models, risk analysis, asset management and

critical aspects of running and maintaining a security program are addressed in detail by bodies such

as SP99 and PCSRF. The open approach of inviting industry wide input and comment will greatly

improve security at all levels . . . national, business and personal.

Thanks to the forerunners in the commercial environment, there is a strong base from which industrial

users can begin the work of adapting and customizing current security standards and protocols to

support industrial applications. But, as they begin to reap the benefits of remote access, care must be

taken to avoid security breaches. Commerce has led the way with highly secure financial, medical,

and retail applications, however, the complexities of industrial security require careful thought and

planning – and in many cases, a different take on a security strategy.

User authentication for controlling access and encryption are not only desirable but essential for secure

industrial applications. Ethernet switches with web management can offer a powerful point of control.

Additionally, remote web management is desirable and feasible with currently available hardware and

software, including GUIs for simplicity and ease-of-use. However, complete end-to-end design for

security is necessary, and it is incumbent on everyone to work toward highly secure network systems

that enable the industry to take advantage of the tremendous time- and cost-savings of web-based

networking.

A single white paper cannot possibly provide the specific guidelines that multiple prestigious industry

working committees are laboring to describe. At the same time, this white paper is intended to be

helpful by providing a basic understanding of the security levels that can currently be achieved at the

Ethernet switch level, assisting readers in appreciating the multiple levels of industrial network

security and the overall complexity required to achieve a highly secure distributed communications

system.

REFERENCES

Bond, Andrew, “Security Could Put Process Control Under IT”, ControlGlobal.com, The Online Resource of

Control Magazine, April 11, 2005, http://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2005/293.html.

Byres, Eric, “Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control Systems”, ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.01-2004,

The Instrumentation, Systems and Automation Society, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, April, 2004.

Case, J, Mundy, R, Partain, D, Stewart, B, “Network Working Group Request for Comments: 3410”, The

Internet Society, Reston, Virginia, December, 2002

Herbert, Dan, “Process Control Security”, ControlGlobal.com, The Online Resource of Control Magazine,

October 23, 2004, http://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2004/292.html.

Melton, Ron, Fletcher, Terry, Earley, Matt, “System Protection Profile – Industrial Control Systems”, Version

1.0, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland, April, 2004.

Merritt, Rich, “What’s in Your Server”, ControlGlobal.com, The Online Resource of Control Magazine,

February 25, 2005, http://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2005/347.html.

Singer, Brian, “Security Standards: Those Available Today and Future Directions”, Proceedings of ISA

President’s Fall Meeting, Houston Texas, October 4, 2004.

Webb, Bob, “Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and Control Systems Environment”,

ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.02-2004, The Instrumentation, Systems and Automation Society, Research Triangle Park,

North Carolina, April, 2004.

APPENDIX A

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SP99 AND PCSRF

At the vanguard of developing security guidelines for industrial control systems are the

Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society (ISA) and the National Institute of Standards and

Technology (NIST). ISA, through its SP99 committee, has published two technical reports on

manufacturing and control systems security that address the growing threats to industrial system

security. The NIST Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF) has issued the System

Protection Profile for Industrial Control Systems (SPP-ICS).

The SP99 committee, Manufacturing and Control Systems Security, represents a cross-section of the

industrial market with representation from control system vendors, end-users, system integrators,

consultants, and cyber security vendors. The first two reports from the committee, which were

published in 2004, are: "Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control Systems" (ISA-

TR99.00.01-2004, or TR1) and "Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and Control

Systems Environment" (ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 or TR2).

TR1 provides guidance for using currently available electronic security technologies, without making

specific technology recommendations. It categorizes 28 electronic security technologies into five

‘buckets”:

•authentication and authorization;

•filtering/blocking/access control;

•encryption and data validation;

•audit, measurement, monitoring and detection tools;

•computer software and physical security controls.

Both control engineers and IT management can use the document to understand the opportunities and

limitations of deploying IT-based security methods in a real-time environment.

The document provides information on each technology regarding:

•security vulnerabilities addressed by this technology;

•typical deployment;

•known issues and weaknesses;

•assessment of use in the manufacturing and control system environment.

In addition it discusses anticipated future directions, offers recommendations and guidance, and points

the reader to information sources and reference material.

While TR1 can be considered a primer, TR2 offers more comprehensive information regarding

methodologies and components necessary to create a complete security program, and suggests a

process to implement more secure systems. Since most control systems are a combination of newer

and legacy components, rather than a “built-from-scratch” environment, each system will require

individual evaluation.

Today SP99 is developing a draft of the first of what will be a series of industry standards related to

manufacturing security.

The NIST PCSRF’s System Protection Profile for Industrial Control Systems (SPP-ICS), released in

2004, is a baseline document that states necessary industrial security requirements at an

implementation-independent level. It will be used to create security specifications for specific systems

and components, such as a water treatment system or a power substation.

The NIST PCSRF includes a number of members of the SP99 Committee, and is chartered to define

common information security requirements for process control systems in the future. The Forum

consists of more than 450 members from government, academic, and private sectors.

The current document is an extension of ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria. Common Criteria is

widely used in secure government operations, such as the FAA. The SPP-ICS looks at these concepts

in relation to industrial automation. Industrial facilities can use it to specify security functional

requirements for new systems. At the same time, vendors can use it to demonstrate assurance that

their products meet these security requirements.

APPENDIX B

SECURITY STANDARDS IN USE IN ETHERNET INSTALLATIONS

The protocols and standards listed below are readily available components that can be used to

implement secure Ethernet networks in factories, power substations and other industrial sites.

SNMP

Simple Network Management Protocol, introduced in 1988, is a standard for gathering and managing

statistical data about network traffic and the behavior of network components such as switches, hubs,

routers and any device which is SNMP enabled. It is based on the manager/agent model and is used in

TCP/IP and other networks to monitor and control network devices, and manage configurations,

statistics collection, and performance. It is easy to implement, install, and use, and does not place

undue burden on the network. Even better, SNMP modules from different vendors work together with

minimal effort. However, early versions of SNMP did not adequately address the issue of security.

Basic security, in the form of authentication and encryption, was first proposed in 1998 with SNMPv3.

Accepted as a full Internet standard in 2002, SNMPv3 assures that a received message was transmitted

by the entity whose identifier appears as the source in the message header, it assures that the message

was not altered in transit and that there was not artificial delay or replay. It also provides for the

ability to update configuration parameters in SNMP agents, thus enabling complete remote

management of SNMP devices, which is an added convenience as Web management comes into play.

It is important to note that SNMPv3 adds several levels of capability, and increasing complexity, to an

SNMP implementation. Unless an implementation requires security features, most SNMP

deployments will remain at SNMPv1 or SNMPv2. Perhaps the wisest approach for a vendor of

Ethernet switches is to continue to offer these earlier versions, as well as SNMPv3, in its network

management package to accommodate users with various levels of security requirements.

Communicating SNMPv3 engines share a secret authentication key that is provided by the sending

entity. When the receiving entity gets the message, it uses the same secret key to calculate the

message authentication code again. If the receiver’s version of the code matches the value appended to

the incoming message, then the receiver knows that the message can only have originated from the

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